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This paper is concerned with the relationship between the organization of political 
hunger strikes, rational calculations and actions and emotions. Drawing from the 
theoretical formulations of Norbert Elias, we examine how rational–emotional 
balances generated by different and intertwined tiers of social integration partly 
shaped the organization of political hunger strikes. Political hunger strikes are 
interesting because they tend to involve actions based on rational considerations 
and emotional charges. The empirical context includes a comparative analysis 
across space and time involving the organization of political hunger strikes in 
Ireland and (West) Germany during the 20th century. Our analysis suggests a 
difference between the rational– emotional tension balance exhibited by hunger 
strikers of the 1920s and that of hunger strikers of the 1970s and 1980s. We 
explain how these differences are connected to the broader social structures 
pertaining at the time. The main contention of the paper is that all forms of 
political organizing involve rational–emotional balances, and these balances are 
structured and shaped by social dynamics at different tiers of social integration. 
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This paper examines the relationship between rational–emotional balances and 
the organizing of political hunger strikes within prisons. By political hunger strikes, 
we are referring to the actions of individuals comprising or allied to social groups 
which contest both the status conferred on them by the state and the state’s wider 
activities (and in some cases the state’s very legitimacy). In that sense hunger 
strike organization proceeds in relation to the practices, structures and ideologies 
of another organization – the state. Political hunger strikes are particularly 
interesting because they tend to involve actions based on rational considerations 
and emotional charges (Yuill, 2007). Drawing from the theoretical formulations of 
Norbert Elias (2012[1939]) we examine how rational–emotional balances 
generated by different and intertwined tiers of social integration partly shape the 
organization of political hunger strikes within prisons. The work of Elias has long 
been recognized by sociologists as relevant to the study of emotions (Burkitt, 1997; 
Kuzmics, 1991). Elias’s approach is relational, and much of his work deals with 
changes in drives and emotional controls (external and internal), often captured 
within a broader movement between social and self-restraint, and their relationship 
to changing social interdependences. Emphasis on greater self-constraint 
underpins a greater capacity to think and act more rationally and forms one strand 
of his formulations on specific theoretical observations around rationalization 
processes. 
Hunger strikes are a form of political resistance, generally involving the refusal 
to eat (and sometimes drink) as a means of protest to seek some form of change 
to a set of direct material conditions and/or wider socio-political objectives 
(Skleparis, 2017). They are also a form violence, violence against the self – one 
can physically harm or kill oneself. And, like war (Malešević, 2017), they always 
require some level of organization. The study of organization often involves a focus 
on rationalization. Indeed, as Courpasson and Reed (2004: 6) suggest, 
rationalization ‘has been the compulsory point of departure for any analysis of 
modern organization in any kind of social context, whether it be the lecture theatre, 
the television studio or the democratic assembly’. At the same time, given the very 
nature of hunger striking – the risk of death, the physical and emotional pain – 
hunger strikes arouse considerable and varied emotional experiences for both 
hunger strikers themselves and many others. Yuill (2007) makes the observation 
that the ‘actions of the Hunger Strikers could be seen as an example where both 
emotions and rationality work in tandem and are embodied in their actions’. The 
idea that thought and actions, rationally or emotionally derived, are not separate 
but connected and interdependent has currency within the sociological literature 
(Kuzmics, 1991). Even Weber, generally perceived as the primary sociologist of 
rationalization, was concerned with emotions (Albrow, 1992). Indeed both Weber 
and Elias conceive of rationality as referring to the calculation of the balance 
between short-term desires and emotional inclinations on the one hand, and the 
longer-term consequences of human action on the other. The more the balance is 
weighted towards the latter, the more rational are the actions (van Krieken, 2014). 
Because this shifting balance is integral to processes of organization, the isolation 
and separation of rationalization processes from emotions has been identified as 
deeply problematic in an empirical and theoretical sense (Barbalet, 2002). 
This brings us to an important contribution of our paper – to illustrate empirically 
how rational and emotional thoughts and actions are inseparable. That means that 
they should be understood, and treated, as relational social phenomena; one 
cannot understand the structure and nature of one without considering the other. 
Yet, studies continue to treat them as discrete phenomena. For instance, in their 
study of genocide, Stokes and Gabriel (2010: 476) claim that ‘Modern genocides, 
as studied by historians, reveal themselves to be organized and managed ventures 
rather than spontaneous spasms of hatred’. This implies a separation between the 
rational and the emotional. Our study suggests, in support of Elias, that organizing 
involves rational–emotional balances and these balances are structured and shaped 
by social dynamics at different tiers of social integration. 
The paper begins with an outline of Elias’s formulations around the subject of 
rational–emotional balances. The next section concerns our methodological 
approach and the empirical settings. These relate to the organization of hunger 
strikes by members of militant republican organizations in Ireland1 and members 
of the Red Army Faction (RAF) in the former West Germany during the 20th 
century. As Wouters (1990: 706) suggests, explaining variations in collective and 
individual emotional developments demands an inquiry ‘into the ways in which 
“local” processes of emotional development and their result, the dominant 
emotional make-up or social habitus, can be understood, interpreted and explained 
by comparing their structural characteristics to those of other places and periods’. 
Consequently, the selection and analysis of data involved not just the ‘localised’ 
settings of hunger strikes but also data relating to dynamic social structures. We 
then present our data analysis which involves a synthesis of different levels of social 
integration before concluding with a discussion of our main arguments. 
 
 
Elias, rationalization, and emotions 
Elias saw rationalization processes as a narrow element within the broader 
dynamic of the self-control of emotions. For Elias (2012[1939]) rationalization is 
processual and part of a wider social process involving shifts in the balance between 
social and self-constraints, in the direction of the latter. It involves a greater (and 
more deeply ingrained) capacity for reflective hindsight, foresight, and calculation 
over longer and more complex chains of events. This relates to observation of 
oneself, others, and social situations more generally. While Elias does distinguish 
between self-restraint and rationalization (and other processes), they remain 
inseparable. Thus, in the hands of Elias, rationality is understood as being shaped 
relationally (through social interdependences at different levels of social 
integration) and is interconnected with a person’s emotional controls and the ability 
to exercise a specific type and level of control of one’s emotions. Consequently, 
those with the capacity for exercising more even and advanced levels of foresight 
and rationality simultaneously exert corresponding levels of self-control over their 
emotions. Interestingly, the fluidity (it is processual) in Elias’s conception of 
rational–emotional balances does not negate the cementing of rational–emotion 
balances in the habitus; such balances do crystallize and take a specific form which 
is connected with the particular structure of society. 
Elias’s (2012[1939]) main contention is that rationalization is one manifestation 
of a wider process in which the balance between social and self-restraints shifts in 
the direction of the latter (he argues this became increasingly perceptible from the 
16th century). 
 In that sense, it is not possible to merely draw upon Elias’s formulations on 
rationalization in isolation of his wider theory and related works. Elias explained 
through empirical-theoretical elaboration how the twin processes of expanding 
social differentiation, the social competition that drives and propels it further, and 
the formation of effective monopolies for the control of violence makes life in 
general more calculable while simultaneously generating a compulsion for 
exercising greater self-restraint. As the web of interdependences in which people 
are enmeshed expands and lengthens, people are required, in their efforts to 
navigate this social terrain successfully, to take those they are dependent upon into 
greater consideration – their needs, motivations, and demands. From this process 
of increasing social demands and pressures develops a more self-restrained, less 
emotionally volatile and more even habitus, in which the capacity for exercising 
greater self-control, foresight and calculation over longer chains of events becomes 
deeply anchored and second nature to the individual. The habit of a more steady 
and developed foresight is sustained and grows further with the increasing 
differentiation of social functions. This exercise of greater foresight over the actions 
and activities of others goes hand in hand with a process that Elias terms 
‘psychologisation’ – a person’s consideration of others is more nuanced and self-
conscious, and they are more dispassionate in their responses to others. This also 
involves ‘more precise observation of one self and others in terms of longer series 
of motives and causal connections’ (Mennell, 1994: 186). And, as we stressed 
already, while Elias distinguishes between rationalization, psychologization, and 
greater self-control and foresight more generally, they remain in both an empirical 
and theoretical sense largely inseparable and interconnected. Consequently, if the 
pattern of self-control, which has become deeply anchored in individuals, advances 
further so too does their capacity for rationalization and psychologization. 
In that sense, when we speak of rationalization or emotional responses we are 
never referring to one in isolation of the other; they are inseparable in terms of 
understanding the scale, structure and intensity of either. From an Eliasian 
perspective, whether one is examining emotional responses or rational calculations, 
one is invariably considering both simultaneously. Equally there is (and was) always 
a level of rationality involved in how people think and act, as there is too with 
control over spontaneous emotional responses; what differs over time and in 
societies and among different social groups is the relative rational–emotional 
tension balance (Newton, 1999). 
At an individual level, this interweaving of emotions and rationality commences 
at an early age. Rationalization is partly learned; a child is socialized through their 
familial network and others to exert and value a particular form of foresight and 
calculation. This socialization reflects the social standards and expectations 
concerning rational thinking and foresight that have come to pertain at the time, 
or new standards coming to pertain. These standards are filtered through the wider 
development of the national we-group and one’s social class. Middle-class groups 
are generally required to exert greater and more even levels of self-control which 
facilitate greater levels of calculative thought. It is imperative too to point out that 
Elias never suggested that such processes were linear or inevitable. Indeed, as 
both Elias and others (see van Krieken, 1999) illustrate, such a dynamic can run in 
parallel with counter processes involving schisms and reversals. Such counter 
processes are often noticeable during periods of heightened political tensions such 




Data sources and methodological approach 
Our focus in this study is the organization of political hunger strikes within 
prisons. The later point of emphasis – ‘within prisons’ – is significant in that we 
were concerned only with the rational–emotional balances of hunger strikers or 
those imprisoned who were contemplating such action. As we indicated already, 
our empirical settings relate to Ireland (pre and post its partition in 1921) and the 
former West Germany. The number and scale of hunger strikes by militant groups 
differs significantly between Ireland and Germany over the course of the 20th 
century. Hunger strikes have been a constant feature in Irish society over the 
course of the 20th century in comparison with Germany (Passmore, 2011). Most of 
the hunger strikes in Ireland were initiated by Irish nationalists – those opposed to 
British state control or involvement in the governance of Ireland. A wide range of 
sources and material were available to us in respect of some of the Irish hunger 
strikes, including the prison diaries of hungers strikers, archived interviews with 
former hunger strikers, socio-historical monographs, and newspapers. The 
archived interviews of former hunger strikers form part of a large pool of almost 
1,800 statements by Irish militant activists involved in what is known as the 
revolutionary period in Ireland (1913–1921), held by Bureau of Military History 
archives. These statements are based on interviews conducted in the 1940s and 
1950s. Now digitalised, it meant we could use keyword searches such as ‘hunger 
strike’ to trawl through these statements. Two hunger strikers during that period, 
Frank Gallagher and Peadar O’Donnell, would later publish accounts of their 
experiences and these were analysed too. For the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes, 
we relied mainly on historical monographs. 
Our German case relates to the hunger strikes undertaken by members of the 
RAF. Here we relied heavily on the work of historian Leith Passmore. Passmore’s 
(2011) work is based on material accessed at the Hamburg Institute for Social 
Research and the Federal archive in Germany. This included RAF texts, posters, 
material confiscated from their lawyers, writings found in their prison cells, police 
reports and trial transcripts. Passmore’s meticulous detail and citing meant we were 
able to consider the provenance of the source including the author, where and when 
it was produced, its function and intended purpose, and the wider context in which 
it was written. This type of source appraisal is crucial within historical 
methodological approaches (Scott, 1990). Interestingly, in addition to drawing on 
Elias’s theoretical contributions, we also critically examined his empirical data on 
members of the RAF. This appeared in his book Studies on the Germans, which 
although mainly directed at explaining the rise of the Nazis and the extermination 
of the Jews also examined the activities and membership of the extra-
parliamentary groups (the RAF) of 1960s and 1970s West Germany. 
As noted, in both the Irish and German cases, we relied on many secondary 
sources – manuscripts written by historians and other social scientists. This mix of 
sources helps overcome some of the difficulties associated with reliance on a single 
piece of data as a source of facts. Our analysis was theory guided which aided 
interpretation and involved an analysis of individual strikes and time-periods 
followed by a comparative analysis across space and time. Interpretation of the 
data involved not just a consideration of multiple accounts (where possible) of the 
same event but a critical approach to the theory including an iterative process 
between theory and data in which the theoretical formulations are considered 
against the empirical evidence. This in turn enables greater trust the emerging 
synthesis. 
Furthermore, as our analysis involved linking different levels of social 
integration, from lower to higher tier levels, we also required data beyond the 
context of specific hunger strikes and the organizations the prisoners comprised. 
For data on the changing social structures relating to Ireland we drew on the work 
of Dolan (2009a, 2009b) and Daly (2016). We supplemented this with further data 
– historical monographs and other studies particularly in relation to Northern 
Ireland. To examine the changing social structure in Germany we examined and 
drew from the works of Fulbrook (2015) and O’Dochartaigh (2004). Wouters’ 
(2007) work provided a related and supporting synthesis on the changing social 
habitus of Germans in the 20th century. 
 
 
Analysis: prison hunger strikes and rational–emotional 
balances 
Beginning with data concerning hunger strikes that occurred in Ireland in the 
1920s our analysis is organized and presented to illustrate comparative differences 
from temporal and national perspectives. Specifically these differences relate to 
variances in the rational–emotional balances of those involved in Irish hunger 
strikes in the 1920s and those involved in the strikes of the 1980s, as well as 
differences with those involved in German hunger strikes of the 1970s. 
 
The 1920s Irish hunger strikes 
Hunger striking re-emerged as a political and military tactic in Ireland in the 
early decades of the 20th century. The increasing militancy of the Irish nationalist 
movement from 1916 came to include hunger striking. The hunger strikes in 1917 
occurred as the perceived legitimacy of British state control in Ireland weakened 
and the state’s control of the monopoly of violence began to disintegrate (Lee, 
1989). According to Stover (2014), by 1920 hunger striking had surpassed all other 
forms of prison protest2 in Ireland as the primarily means by which republican 
prisoners3 sought to oppose the prison authorities and the British state. Imprisoned 
Irish militants (now operating as the Irish Republican Army (IRA)) regularly raised 
the prospect of initiating hunger strikes. The following are some accounts to 
illustrate this: 
 
After seven or eight days’ hunger strike as a protest for political treatment, 
we were sent by boat from Cobh to Belfast. The weather was unduly bad for 
the month of March, spring tides prevailed, and one can realise the 
seasickness of eleven men who had been imprisoned for a considerable 
time. 
 
After about a fortnight in Belfast, we again decided on hunger strike as the 
only weapon available, and we were then transferred to Mountjoy Prison, 
Dublin, . . . 
 
After some weeks, we decided finally we were going on hunger strike to get 
either political treatment or release. (Witness Statement 1348, Michael Davern, 
Bureau of Military History, p.31) 
 
 
While the suggestion of going on hunger strike often appeared to be raised 
somewhat impulsively, the final decision was based on a level of calculation and 
analysis. For instance, in 1920 Irish republican prisoners held at Wormwood 
Scrubbs prison in England conducted a ballot on whether to hunger strike (Witness 
Statement 1393, Edmond McGrath, Bureau of Military History). One prisoner, Seán 
O’Carroll, recalled his experience of arriving at Wormwood Scrubbs. He noted that 
100 prisoners were already on hunger strike and 60 others had refused to join: 
 
 
Both sides put their case before us (the fifteen new arrivals). The hunger-
strikers declared they had the approval of G.H.Q. for the strike, and the 
non-strikers maintained they had sent a special courier to Dublin and had 
been refused permission to strike. After we had heard 
both of their stories we decided to adjourn and consider our own position. 
 
We decided that, no matter who was right or who was wrong at the start, it 
was up to every man now to go on hunger-strike, and we appealed to the 
non-hungers to join in at once, and have a united front against the common 




Similar levels of rational analysis are evident in the process around a suggested 
another hunger strike in 1923 during the Irish Civil War4. According to Healy 
(1982) the strike was initiated by a written message from the Director of 
Intelligence for the Republican forces, but the ultimate decision was left to the 
commanding officer in each prison, but in many cases it was ‘democratically’ 
decided by the prisoner groups themselves. Indeed, one prisoner recalled: 
 
I called a meeting of the prisoners, informed them of the position, and 
pointed out to them that there was no suitable action we could take except 
to go on hunger-strike for political treatment. I was supported by the 
majority of the prisoners when the vote was taken. (Witness Statement 
485, Brigid O’Mullane, Bureau of Military History, p.14) 
 
 
Peadar O’Donnell (2013 [1932]: 152), who was also imprisoned at that time, 
notes in a diary that experienced hunger strikers were consulted in coming to the 
decision. We emphasize these examples to illustrate that while the idea to hunger 
strike may have been raised rather spontaneously and without significant levels 
of calculation, the final decision suggests that much greater levels of rational 
thought were brought to bear on the process. These calculations – the weighing 
up of outcomes, consideration of the experiences of those had previously gone on 
hunger strike, the willingness to debate the  issues – were interwoven with strong 
emotive impulses and pulls. For instance, another prisoner at the time (1923), 
Joseph O’Connor, displayed considerable calculation (rational thinking) in initially 
opposing the strike. He reasoned that ‘most of our men were more than a year 
locked up, not overfed, and their physical condition bad’. He also felt that the 
hunger strike ‘for freedom was a spent force since Terry McSweeney’s death (in 
1920)’. This was indicative too of considerable reflection and hindsight. Yet, 
despite this ‘rational’ analysis, including consideration of what a strike might 
achieve and his resultant opposition to a strike, he still joined the strike because 
he ‘couldn’t stand by and let others fight for my freedom without standing by 
them’ (Witness Statement 544, Joseph O’Connor, Bureau of Military History, p. 
27). His reason illustrates just one of the emotional pulls that people also 
experienced in parallel with rational considerations. The emotional charges such 
as this, generated by different social interdependences and we-feelings, could lead 
to individual psychological conflicts. Guilt, shame and fear could interlope with 
hope, dreams and fantasy. The we-group of fellow prisoners, or even the wider 
group they comprised, the IRA, existed alongside other emotional charges 
generated by the we-image of the nation. Although there was a connection 
between these we-images – the we-feelings towards the IRA were partly 
generated by we-feelings towards the nation – they could also conflict with each 
other. For instance, during the 1920 hunger strike Frank Gallagher (1928: 79–
80) documented his own torment over a request from a fellow prisoner, Brennan, 
who had seven children at home: 
 
Brennan says he has fasted nine days . . . It is not his courage which is 
lacking. But he has seven kiddies . . . If he dies, they starve . . . ‘My heart 
is torn out of me thinking of them’, the letter says. ‘The Doctor told me this 
morning that I cannot live without brandy. I would not ask it for myself. . . If 
you say no, I will not take anything’ . . . My impulse was to let him decide 
for himself whether he should take anything or not . . . Then realized that, 
horrible though refusal was, this was the test case . . . The answer, if other 
men’s lives are to be saved must be, ‘Take nothing’. . . . A bitter answer . . . 
Yet, how can it be otherwise? . . . If this strike breaks, not ourselves alone, 
but Ireland is beaten . . . Men must die . . . But it is awful to have to kill 
men . . . to have to starve little children . . . 
 
 
The level of coordination within the various Irish hunger strikes of the 1920s 
was relatively rudimentary, hampered too on occasion by the large numbers 
involved and their disparate locations. For example, in the 1923 strike, which 
involved somewhere between 2,000 to 8,000 prisoners, the vast majority 
abandoned the strike within the first month (Healy, 1982; Sweeney, 1993). 
Prisoners started to come off the hunger strike after days, weeks and months but 
this was unplanned and uncoordinated (this, as will be illustrated later, is in 
contrast to the hunger strikes of the 1980s). Emotional impulses often took hold 
and were as much a basis for ending strikes as they were for starting them. 
O’Donnell (2013[1932]: 161) notes in his diary how stampedes took place in some 
prisons over food and the strike was called off altogether. Knowledge about 
hunger striking and its effects was relatively rudimentary. Scientific knowledge 
was interwoven with fantasy, often transmitted by gossip channels. One hunger 
striker from the 1920s recalled that there was a rumour that after fifteen days on 
hunger strike, you lived off the marrow of your bones and you could end up a 
cripple as a result. He claimed that five to six hundred came off a strike because 
of this rumour alone (Witness Statement 1209, Stephen Keys, Bureau of Military 
History, p.40). Fears and fantasy shaped the scale of the strike in terms of 
numbers. This ‘fantasy’ knowledge of fasting can be contrasted with the 
knowledge available to RAF members on hunger strike in the 1970s, which we 
discuss later. 
There were coordinating activities throughout the course of the various strikes 
at this time. In the 1923 strike messages were organized between the different 
prisons to garner the state of conditions and how individual strikes were holding 
within each prison. 
 The cessation of the strikes also involved a level of calculation and 
coordination. For instance O’Donnell (2013[1932]: 178) recalls a meeting with 
other senior hunger strikers in their prison: 
 
Tom Derrig, Frank Gallagher, Michael Kilroy and I were together at the final 
talk that decided that messengers from our jail should go to the other 
prisons and arrange that we all cease together. We should all cease 
otherwise Kilmainham [prison] could not come off, for most of those who 
had begun the strike were there. 
 
 
The extent of the level of coordination and calculation really only becomes 
perceptible when compared against later strikes in Ireland (and Germany). 
Consequently, we now turn to the organization of hunger strikes in the 1980s, 
which occurred in the territory known as Northern Ireland. 
 
The 1980s Irish hunger strikes 
The 1980 hunger strike (the prelude to the now more infamous 1981 strike, 
in which 10 hunger strikers would die) was essentially an escalation of the prison 
protests known as the blanket and dirty protests5, which had been ongoing since 
the reintroduction of a criminalization policy by the British state in 1976 (Bishop 
and Mallie, 1988; O’Malley, 1990). Members of the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and 
another militant republican group, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), 
considered themselves, as did others, as prisoners-of-war. Indeed, the British 
state had essentially perceived them as such prior to the mid-1970s with 
republican prisoners permitted to organize themselves within the prisons as 
military units with a related organizational and command type structure (Bishop 
and Mallie, 1988). The 1980 strike emanated from the perceived failure of the 
blanket and dirty protest to extract concessions from the British authorities and 
consideration of the options now left open – abandon, continue dirty protest, or 
elevate to the next level of protest. For instance, Brendan Hughes (a prisoner at 
the time) on hearing of the failure of negotiations with the British recalled: ‘I 
thought “Jesus, where do you go from here?” [. . .] I knew the only option left 
was hunger strike’ (cited in Ross, 2011: 85). As with the 1920s strikes, there was 
both a rational and emotive aspect to the decision to go on strike. Yet, the 
planning and coordination of the strike indicates a far greater level of calculation 
and foresight than those organized in the 1920s. First, the timing of the strike 
was planned to ensure that the fast would peak at Christmas (O’Malley, 1990; 
Ross, 2011). This suggests that the prisoners had thought through the possible 
media coverage, imagery and emotional pangs, which could be generated by 
contrasting starving men on their deathbeds against the iconography associated 
with Christmas – feasts, indulgence and the espousal of peace and goodwill 
towards others. It is an example too of reflective hindsight and calculation. 
The selection process was also indicative of this and involved far greater 
rational thought and relative bureaucratization in comparison to the 1920s strikes. 
Unlike these strikes, which were generally open to anyone who wished to take 
part, the 1980 strike was restricted to seven. The reason for seven men6 was to 
symbolically link with the seven signatories of the 1916 declaration of Irish 
independence (O’Malley, 1990). This was a calculated effort to not only create a 
symbolic link with the revolt by Irish militants in 1916, but also with the 
signatories who were subsequently executed by the British authorities. The extent 
of the calculation in the selection process can also be seen from the decision to 
select prisoners from five of the six counties under British jurisdiction so as to 
emotionally connect and mobilize as many nationalists as possible within those 
counties (Ross, 2011). Consideration was also given to the character of those to 
be chosen. This was partly based on how they had negotiated the prison conditions 
up to this point. All had to have demonstrated stamina and resilience during their 
part in the dirty protest and all were in leadership positions within the prison 
structure (O’Malley, 1990). A committee made up of the seven hunger strikers 
and ‘block OC’s [Officer Commanding-prisoner leaders]7 took decisions pertaining 
to the strike (O’Malley, 1990). There was also considerable coordination with 
outside support groups to mobilize public pressure and develop publicity 
campaigns. 
The confused end of this strike and the sense of failure in achieving its 
purported aims, which many of the prisoners felt was the case (O’Malley, 1990), 
was the spur for the 1981 hunger strike. In that way, the impetus for this strike 
was driven less from rational calculation and more from an emotional charge 
generated by the sense of failure of the first strike, allied with the brutalizing 
effects of almost four years of blanket and dirty protests. While a level of 
emotional charge was an important impetus for the hunger strikes of the 1920s 
and the 1980 strike, in this instance (1981 strike), the emotional charge was 
acutely strong. The leadership outside the prison was opposed to it mainly on the 
basis that they calculated it would fail. The then leader of Sinn Féin, the political 
wing of the PIRA, wrote to the prisoners stating, ‘We are tactically, strategically, 
physically and morally opposed to the hunger strike’ (cited in O’Malley, 1990: 72). 
The hunger strike was pushed by Bobby Sands who had been an OC involved in 
coordinating the previous 1980 hunger strike. O’Malley (1990: 72) suggests that 
there was ‘no strategy – no clearly defined plan of how to proceed, no contingency 
arrangements, no back-up cover’. However, once some of the prisoners persisted 
with their intention to strike (which was also linked with inter-organizational 
competition between the PIRA and INLA) the level of rationalization and 
bureaucratization involved in organizing the strike grew. There was to be a gap 
between Sands (who would lead off the hunger strike) and the next hunger striker. 
This was to allow time for the British authorities to reflect on what to do before a 
second person would die. Initially only four were selected but a short list of 
potential follow-up strikers was drawn up (O’Malley, 1990). The subsequent death 
of Sands on hunger strike and the emotional charges generated by his death 
within the prison greatly re-shaped the strike’s structure and organization. For 
instance, the Army council [leadership] of the PIRA instructed the strike be called 
off but this direct ‘military order’ was disobeyed by the next prisoner on strike 
(O’Malley, 1990), which essentially escalated the strike; emotional charges 
outweighed more rational considerations. However, greater levels   of rational 
calculation would soon be deployed once the strike persisted. As more men put 
their names forward, criteria were developed for categorizing individuals 
acceptable or unacceptable for the strike. Consequently, those wishing to take 
part had to supply details of arrest, interrogation, and sentence. The nature of the 
offence for which a prisoner had been convicted was a major consideration in the 
selection process – some were immediately ruled out because of their offences – 
depending on the offence it would be easier to counter the portrayal by the British 
authorities and others that the strikers were criminals and murderers (O’Malley, 
1990: 76). Selection for the shortlist was also based on a number of further 
considerations such as ensuring a geographical spread by selecting prisoners from 
different counties. Prisoners with only short sentences remaining would not be 
shortlisted on the grounds that they would be more useful once released 
(O’Malley, 1990). This too had a bureaucratic structure in that the PIRA prison OC 
would select those to go on the list. 
Once selected it was arranged that prisoners would join the strike at fixed 
intervals. Again, this is indicative of considerable hindsight, foresight, and 
calculation. Such a strategy involved knowledge and consideration of the effects 
on the physical and mental wellbeing of prisoners, the effects the hunger strike 
would have in generating public pressure and/or solidarity and the related 
pressure it could mount on the British government. However, interwoven with 
these rationalization processes were strong emotional impulses. More than any 
was the intense bonds that had fomented between the prisoners given the type 
of dependences between them and the longevity of these in many instances. The 
emotional charge generated by this superseded almost all others and this too 
shaped the organization of the hunger strike. It is particularly evident from their 
refusal to accept orders from the outside PIRA leadership. For instance, one 
prisoner, who was on hunger strike for 55 days, stated that it was the commitment 
and consideration of one’s fellow prisoners and hunger strikers that overwhelmed 
all other considerations: ‘it would have taken more courage to actually stop of 
your own accord than to keep going on because it seemed so much like losing 
face . . . and backing down when other men were dying’ (cited in O’Malley, 1990: 
85). 
This is indicative of how rational–emotional considerations are so interwoven 
and inseparable and shape organizing. As the strikes continued and men began 
to die the emotional charges generated by this – loyalty to those that died, guilt, 
fear of failure, anger, and the desire not to concede – increasingly suppressed 
greater rational consideration of how effective the strike was in achieving some 
or all of the aims it was engineered to achieve. There was no agreement as to 
how long the hunger strike should last or how many should be allowed to die. Nor 
had the hunger strikers or wider body of prisoners considered or discussed in 
advance what they would accept as a settlement, what compromises if any they 
would tolerate and accede to (O’Malley, 1990). It would appear that many 
persisted (to their deaths in several cases) with the hunger strike because of the 
emotional charges generated by these intra-prison interdependences. Elias’s 
(2007[1983]) concepts of involvement and detachment are also insightful here in 
understanding how one’s ‘involvement’ can enhance and drive emotional charges 
that act against a more ‘detached’ analysis of social situations. As Elias explained 
in a 1981 lecture (see Elias, 2008: 138), it is enormously difficult for people to 
extricate themselves from a situation in which they can ‘not master dangers 
because of the affectivity and the fantasy content of their thinking, and in which 
the great dangers themselves caused the high level of fantasy and emotionality 
in thinking’. 
 
The 1970s RAF hunger strikes in West Germany 
Like the 1980s Irish hunger strikes, the RAF hunger strikes in the 1970s in 
West Germany suggest more advanced levels of bureaucratization relative to the 
Irish strikes of the 1920s. The organization of the strikes was largely driven by 
calculations and consideration of their publicity and media effects. For instance, 
during the first hunger strike in 1973 Andreas Baader, who had begun the strike, 
stopped the strike ‘because nothing of any significance is afoot outside anymore’ 
(cited in Passmore, 2011: 62). Similarly, the second hunger strike (again in 1973) 
ended when media interest was deemed to have faded (Passmore, 2011). It would 
also appear that significant consideration was given to understanding the physical 
and medical process of fasting by prisoners. For instance, during the second RAF 
hunger strike a manual for starvation was found in Ulrike Meinhof’s (one of the 
RAF leaders) prison cell: 
 
The five-page document described the symptoms associated with self-
starvation, providing the ideal weight loss, and even outlined the critical 
phases of the body’s deterioration: pulse less than sixty or fifty, blood 
protein level of between 3 and 5 percent, a shift in the pH of the blood. 
(Passmore, 2011: 62) 
 
 
This is indicative of considerable rational thought being brought to bear on 
the process; scientific knowledge is sought and possibly drawn upon to facilitate 
or inform a hunger strike. This type of calculative approach to the hunger strikes 
can also be seen in other organizational aspects of the third hunger strike (in 
1974). Prisoners (hunger strikers) stored food and ate at specific times, if 
necessary, so as to prolong their strike (Passmore, 2011), as a strategy. Eating 
was used to control the rate of deterioration so that prisoners would come closer 
to the risk of death at different periods thus generating more sustained and 
heightened media coverage. Undoubtedly, the hunger strike strategy was partly 
linked to publicity generation due to the careers of several of the leading activists, 
such as the former journalist Ulrike Meinhof. 
It would seem there was considerable reflection and contemplation on the 
process of hunger striking. In communications and writings within the prison, 
designed for fellow RAF prisoners, members of the RAF ruminated on what would 
or might be necessary in organizing further hunger strikes – would death be 
required for example. They also alluded to and drew upon narratives associated 
with the IRA hunger strikes of the 1970s (Passmore, 2011). These appeared to 
serve the function of illustrating the effectiveness of such a strategy and bringing 
heroic status to an activity which had a more familiar and mythical status in 
Ireland than in Germany. They actively attempted to orchestrate the 
dissemination of a specific discourse through which a specific image of hunger 
striking would be constructed and choreographed. However, the function of the 
strikes was also to generate a discourse through which the significance and 
meaning of the RAF could be sustained and made tangible to a wider audience. 
This approach was no mere side effect or unplanned consequence of the strike 
but a conscious and deliberate decision and strategy. What it demonstrates also 
is the intellectual thinking directed at the concept of hunger striking as well as 
consideration and calculation of its possible effects. 
There were also class differences between 1970s German hunger strikers, 
who were mainly middle class (Elias, 2013[1989]; Varon, 2004; Vertigans, 2011, 
2016), and the 1980s Irish hunger strikers who were predominately working class 
or lower middle class. This aspect is an interrelated aspect too of the different 
rational–emotional balances and layers of constraints associated with each group. 
The RAF hunger strikes involved a greater element of intellectualization in that 
the actual practice of hunger striking (and violence more generally) receives more 
abstract discussion and conscious reasoning connected to discursive and 
communicative objectives (Varon, 2004). It would seem that there is greater 
conscious reflection on the tactic. Indeed this mirrors what Elias (2013[1989]) 
analysed and suggested in relation to the RAF and their use of physical violence 
more generally, which he argued required, to a considerable extent, ‘justification 
through reflection, legitimisation through a theory’ (p.335). 
 
 
Social structures, rational–emotional balances and 
organizing 
Our primary contention is that there are variations in the rational–emotional 
tension balance exhibited by 1920s Irish hunger strikers and those of the 1980s 
Irish strikers and the 1970s German hunger strikes. And these differences in the 
rational–emotional balances partly shaped the organization of the different hunger 
strikes. We stress that this involves differences in the relative balance between 
spontaneous emotional actions and rational considerations. In this section we 
explain how these differences are connected to the broader structures of society 
(social structures) pertaining at the time. Elias (2012[1939]: 450) maintains that 
rationalization is not solely about changes in ideology or in a person’s knowledge. 
It involves structural changes in the social habitus of people. The driver of this 
process is a transformation in the way in which people are bonded to each other – 
the structure of social interdependences. Consequently, our focus here is the social 
structures that pertained in Ireland in the 1920s and 1980s (and in West Germany 
in the 1970s). Beginning with Ireland, and covering the period from the early 1900s 
to the 1980s (the Irish Free State from 1921, later known as the Republic of Ireland 
from1949), our analysis indicates that the division of functions and chains of 
interdependences within which people were enmeshed became far more extensive 
and longer. Processes of commercialization, international trade, industrialization, 
urbanization, and secularization expanded significantly over this period in tandem 
with an expansion of state functions. These processes also contributed to a 
restructuring of power ratios; mainly a lessening of power imbalances between 
different social groups and categories – social classes, genders, parents-children, 
employers-workers, church-state. These were not linear developments, but uneven 
and contradictory at times. Nonetheless, they occurred within a broader 
development of expanding and social interdependences which generated more 
diverse social pressures on all people (Dolan, 2009a, 2009b) We stress this 
because, as Elias explains, more reflective, long-sighted and calculative capacities 
within the habitus only develop within a social structure where advancing functional 
differentiation and the related expansion in social interdependences continually 
demand them. This expansion in social interdependences in the Republic of Ireland 
ran in parallel with a process of growing state-legitimacy and a state monopoly for 
the control of violence. However, both these developments were fragile due to the 
Irish state formation process. According to Elias (2013[1989]) the successes and 
failures of the nation can become deeply sedimented in the national habitus of a 
people. The partial success of national liberation through violence along with the 
realization that a large group of nationalist minded people were ‘left behind’ 
generated a deeply ingrained guilt (for many who had attained Irish independence) 
as did the inability to address it. This in turn contributed to the lack of perceived 
legitimacy of the Northern Ireland ‘State’ among many Irish people, though to 
varying degrees. It also sustained a level of ambivalence to the use of violence 
there, and in Britain, by Irish militant groups seeking re-unification. 
In Northern Ireland (from 1921) these processes were even more fractured – 
the legitimacy of this social unit, and the state monopoly for the control of violence 
linked with it, were not only weakly accepted by many but also contested. Groups 
seeking different state structures following partition continued to use violence to 
this end. Although this type of violent activity persisted through the decades, it 
escalated considerably in the 1970s. Nonetheless, processes reflecting expanding 
social interdependences did occur between the 1920s and 1980s; agricultural 
employment declined significantly over this period replaced mainly by employment 
in services (Simpson, 1975/1976), while state services also expanded (Rowthorn, 
1981). Agricultural employment, which accounted for 25% of the labour force in 
1945, was 10% by 1970 (Rowthorn, 1981: 5). This changing structure involves, as 
Rowthorn (1981: 12) acknowledges, a move ‘away from traditional manual skills 
learned on the job, towards skills acquired through formal learning in the 
educational system’ and ‘a shift from male to female labour’. This in turn demanded 
and impelled new and different personal and social skills to navigate this more 
complex network of social interdependences. Although employment and other 
social opportunities were still strongly related to ethnic affiliation (Rowthorn, 1981), 
this began to weaken somewhat (it did not disappear) by the 1960s. Expanded 
educational opportunities and a rise in the power chances of nationalists and 
Catholics would contribute to this dynamic. Initially too, it led to a heightening of 
ethnic tensions and hostility in the late 1960s, which in turn were a contributing 
process in the social climate from which the 1980s hunger strikes would emerge. 
Overall, though, it also reflected a move in the direction of less uneven power-
balances between nationalists and unionists. 
While there were differences in the extent and type of social independences in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, overall from the 1920s through to the 
1980s, people in both jurisdictions, of different classes, genders, and ethnic 
identification came under increased social pressure to exert a greater level of self-
restraint demanded by the changing structure of power relations. With this more 
self-restrained habitus comes the capacity for greater foresight, rational thought 
and action. It is this development, which partly explains the structural variation in 
the rational–emotional balance of the 1920s hunger strikers and the 1980s hunger 
strikers. By partly, we mean other social processes involving other tiers of social 
integration – families, the prisons, the militant organizations the hunger strikers 
were part of – all served to intertwine and shape the organization of the hunger 
strikes. 
West Germany too underwent a transformation, becoming more structurally 
complex and expansive in terms of the broad network of social interdependence. 
Not only did the population expand (from 43 million in 19398 to 61.7 million by 
1980), it also became more urbanized. In 1950, 29% of the West German 
population lived in communities of less than two thousand inhabitants. By 1980 
only 6% lived in such communities; instead 74% lived in communities of over 
10,000 (Fulbrook, 2015). This ran in tandem with a change in the structure of 
employment – away from agriculture and manual employment towards ‘white-
collar’ occupations. The ‘social market’ version of capitalism that emerged in the 
1950s also contributed to more even power relations between workers and 
employers (O’Dochartaigh, 2004). Combined with a reduction in the power 
differentials between the social classes, generations, and genders, which were 
connected with the changes just referred to, more social groups of all types were 
compelled to exerted greater levels of self-restraint in their relations with others. 
Wouters’ (2007) work would support our overall contentions in relation to both the 
broader network of interdependences, changing power relations and the 
development of a more self-restrained and more rational social habitus. And while 
Wouters does not document specific changes in rationalization processes, he does 
illustrate the changes in relation to more advanced levels of self-regulation, which 
as we have suggested earlier both reflects and demands a capacity for reflective 
hindsight and foresight over longer chains of events. Our analyses of the RAF 
hunger strikes suggest considerable levels of rationalization were brought to bear 
on their organization, certainly relative to those organized in Ireland in the 1920s. 
We suggest too, somewhat contingently, that there are differences between the 
rational–emotional balances of those involved in the 1980s Irish hunger strikes and 
those partaking in the 1970s German hunger strikes, with the latter betraying more 





This paper’s primary aim was to explain differences in the organization of 
political hunger strikes by considering the relationship between historical variances 
in the rational–emotional balances of people and social structures by drawing on 
the theoretical formulations developed by Elias. We illustrate empirically how 
rational–emotional balances and related organizing are shaped by interweaving and 
conflicting social processes at different tiers of social integration. Expanding and 
lengthening chains of social interdependences and more equal power relations 
occurring at higher tier levels of social integration, which impelled greater 
rationalization, also ran in tandem with other (sometimes) conflicting social 
processes which pushed against this. These included emotional bonds generated 
by face-to-face relationships, perceptions of state legitimacy, the form of state 
formation and the role of violence in this, and continued intra-state violence. 
Finally, we would like to reiterate, and as this study shows, rational and 
emotional thinking and behaviour are inseparable. Consequently, it is the changing 
balance and structure of the rational–emotional relationship, and why and how this 
changes, that should be the focus of social inquiry. 
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Notes 
1. The terms Ireland and Germany refer to various states connected with these 
territories over the course of the 20th century. Ireland refers to the country 
under the jurisdiction of British governments up to 1921 when it was 
partitioned. This led to an independent Irish State, which would become 
known as the Republic of Ireland from 1949 and a self-governing territory 
known as Northern Ireland, which became part of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Germany refers to the nation up to 1945. 
Two states emerged post 1945 when it too was partitioned into what became 
known as East and West Germany or the German Democratic Republic and 
Federal Republic of Germany respectively. 
2. Refusal to obey the prison authorities, destruction of prison property and 
physical attacks on prison warders were the other forms of protest 
undertaken. 
3. Many Irish nationalists began to self-identify as Republicans for they sought 
independent self-government in the form of a Republic. 
4. This strike was actioned as a means to pressurize the Irish Free State 
government to release anti-treaty prisoners. 
5. The blanket protest refers to the refusal of Republican prisoners in Northern 
Ireland to wear prison clothes in response to the British government’s 
criminalization policy in 1970s. This escalated into the dirty protest when 
the prisoners refused to ‘slop-out’ (O’Malley, 1990). 
6. Six were members of the IRA and one INLA member. 
7. OC refers to officer commanding as in a conventional military unit. The PIRA 
organized    as a military unit within the prison with each prison block having 
a commander. The physical structure of the prison resembled a series of H-
shaped structures which lead to the label ‘H-Blocks’ (Bishop and Mallie, 
1988). 
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